Great Theologians 4: Herman Bavinck

Herman Bavinck (1854-1921)

 

Herman Bavinck was perhaps the most significant Dutch Reformed theologian of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, along with Abraham Kuyper and his almost exact contemporary, the American Presbyterdian, B. B. Warfield. He was deeply influential among future generations of both Dutch Reformed and Presbyterian theologians, preachers and believers.

Bavinck was born in the small town of Hoogeveen on 13th December 1854. His father was from Germany and was a minister in the Christian Reformed Church, a conservative and separatist denomination in the Netherlands.

He studied at Kampen and Leiden and wrote his dissertation on the ethics of the Swiss Reformed, Ulrich Zwingli. He was ordained as a minister and appointed as Professor of Theology at Kampen and then later at the Free University of Amsterdam, working alongside Abraham Kuyper. Bavinck died on 29th July 1921, aged 66.

His major theological work is a massive, four-volume Reformed Dogmatics published between 1895 and 1901. Known for its thoroughness in dealing with all areas of theology and engaging with other theological positions and traditions as they existed in Bavinck's time, it remains a high point of Reformed scholarship.

Bavinck took a classic Dutch Reformed stance on many issues, but was not afraid to make his own contributions. For example, Bavinck rejected both supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism in the area of predestination, and insisted that all God's decrees are inseparable, even logically. Bavinck was also a major theologian of the doctrine of common grace, realising that any good in this world among sinful humanity can only be as a result of God's kindness and love in operation. In 1909, he also published a one-volume condensed and simplified version of his dogmatics designed to tbe read by ordinary Reformed believers. Originally entitled Our Reasonable Faith it was later published as The Wonderful Works of God.

Bavinck's work on Reformed Ethics are still being translated into English and being published in various volumnes now.

Amyraldianism, Marrow Theology and Free Offer of the Gospel

I think it was the Princeton theologian, A. A. Hodge, who said that the free offer of the gospel was the point where the opponents of Calvinism have rightly focused their main attack. 

The reason for this is obvious. The distinctive of Reformed theology is particularism. Reformed theology teaches that God chooses some people for salvation, not everyone (unconditional election), that Christ died with the intention of saving only the elect and not everyone (limited atonement/particular redemption), and that God irresistibly or effectually calls only some by his grace to receive saving faith.

The problem with this particularism, true to Scripture though it is, is that it would seem to be in conflict with other Scriptures that teach that, at a minimum, the gospel call is to be made to all indiscriminately—elect and non-elect alike, and that there would seem to be some sense in which God wishes or desires everyone to heed the gospel invitiation and be saved.

This apparent tension has been addressed in numerous ways by theologians.

The Arminians address it by denying the Reformed truths of unconditional election, particular redemption and irresistible grace and thereby fall outside the sphere of Reformed theology. Since they maintain a sincere gospel offer to all, they conclude that there is no sovereign decree choosing some for salvation and not others, that Christ's death was an attempted atonement for everyone, and that God's grace tries to draw all the salvation. The definining element between the saved and the lost therefore becomes the human free will, the choice to believe or not.

At the other extreme, Hyper-Calvinism, addresses the tension by denying that the free offer of the gospel is for all, elect and non-elect alike. Instead, in one way or another, the Hyper-Calvinist restricts the gospel offer to the elect only.

Arminianism and Hyper-Calvinism are the most extreme ways of meeting the apparent tension between Reformed theology's particularism of salvation for the elect alone and a free offer of the gospel for everyone. In a sense, both are rationalistic solutions to the apparent inconsistency of insising that both are true. They solve the "problem" by denying one side or the other in the tension.

Within the broad sweep of Reformed theology, there have been other attempts to explain or handle this tension. Two are of special interest, and in this author's view, one is deeply problematic, while the other is in harmony with the Reformed confessions.

Amyraldianism 

Amyraldianism is a deformed type of Reformed theology, named after a French theologian, Moise Amyraut, who taught at Saumur in the 17th century. Sometimes misleadingly called "Four Point Calvinism," Amyraldianism attempts to "soften" Reformed orthodoxy in the doctrines of unconditional election and especially particular redemption. 

First, as regards the doctirne of God's decree, Amyraldians suggest that there is a twofold aspect to the decree, whereby God first decreed hypothetically to save everyone without exception on the condition of faith in Christ, then recognising this would actually save none, God decreed to save the elect unconditionally or absolutely.

Second, Amyraldians hold to an unlimited atonement (i.e. that Christ's death was intended to make a universal provision for the salvation of all (in accord with the first decree) and it is only the application of salvation that is for the elect. 

Obviously, this view is at odds with orthodox Reformed theology, although it does hold to a form of uncondtional electon by adding a former conditional decree to save all and making the atonement universal. 

Amyraldianism is a kind of unstable half-way house between Calvinism and Arminianism and contrary to the Westminster Confession and the Canons of Dort, which know nothing of a hypothetical decree to save all and teach that Christ's death was intended only to save the elect.

The seeming rationale behind Amyraldianism is to make a genuine free offer of salvation possible to all because the atonement is viewed as made by Christ for all without exception. But as we will see, it is perfectly possible to hold to particular redemption and make a full and free offer of the gospel to sinners, as the Marrow Men demonstrated in Scotland in the 18th century.

Marrow Theology 

The famous Marrow Controversy in the Church of Scotland of the early 18th century touches on some of the same issues in theology. Named after a Purtian book, The Marrow of Modern Divinity (1645) by Edward Fisher, it split theological opinion in the Scottish Presbyterian church. From my perspective, I would tend to side with the Marrow Men and against their opponents. 

They were right to oppose the legalism and preparationism found in the Church of Scotland of the day. They were right to insist on the distinction between law and gospel. And they were right to preach the free offer of the gospel to all sinners. They did so while remaining orthodox, five point Calvinists.

However, the Marrow theology did introduce what A. A. Hodge termed some 'novelties' into Reformed theology and these are not beyond criticism. In particular, the Marrow theology can be said to have introduced a kind of twofold reference in the atonement, making it both a general gift to all humanity as well as particular gift to save only the elect. Such confusion is not helpful and could be seen as watering down the particularism of Dort and the Westminster Confession. 

The Marrow approach to the free offer in Fisher's book, later endorsed by the likes of Thomas Boston and the Erskine brothers, can be summarised in two well-known phrases in the Marrow that I would focus on in this regard. Fisher wrote:

The Father hath made a deed of gift and grant unto all mankind, that whosoever of them all shall believe in his Son shall not perish, but have eternal life.

The Marrow Men and Fisher used John 3:16 to support this view. Most Reformed theologians prior to this viewed the love of God in John 3:16 has God's saving love, lavished only on God's elect. The Marrow Men instead saw the love God is said to have for the world as being less than the saving, electing love that leads to the savlation of all the elect. The Marrow Men saw instead that the love of John 3:16 was genuinely for all sinners, and the giving of Christ was as God's appointed Saviour for mankind, offered to all who believe. 

A similar view, that the love of God for the world in John 3:16 extends to everyone, would appear to be the majority view among contemporary Reformed theologians. 

The old view, of the likes of John Owen and Francis Turretin that the 'world' in John 3:16 means Gentiles and Jews—everyone without distinction rather than everyone without exception, and with some kind of reference to the elect of all nations—now appears to be the minority view among Calvinists. 

Along similar lines is the second famous (or infamous) quotation from the Marrow:

Go and tell every man without exception, that here is good news for him, Christ is dead for him; and if he will take him, and accept of his righteousness, he shall have him.

The Marrow Men believed in particular redemption, that Christ died with the intention of saving only the elect. Yet alongside this, they accepted the rather strange language (not found in Scripture) that Christ is dead for all sinners who hear the gospel. So Christ did not die for all, but Christ is dead for all, by which they meant that not only was the message of Christ crucified (1 Corinthians 1:23; 2:2) was to be preached to all sinners in the free offer, but that God has a non-saving kind of love in the realm of salvation for al sinners without exception.

As with the "deed of gift and grant" language, it seems clear—at least in Boston's reading of the Marrow that the phrase means no more than that when the gospel offer is preached, the question is not whether a person is elect so that they know if the atonement was made for them, but rather that they know they are a sinner and that if they come to faith in Christ they will be saved no matter what they have done. That's what was meant by "Christ is dead" for sinners.

The trouble is that the Marrow theology comes perilously close to a kind of Amyralianism of its own. In other words, in teaching that there is in the gift of Christ for the world a divine intent (albeit a non-efficacious intent) not merely to save elect sinners, but to save all sinners.

In is excellent work on The Atonement, A. A. Hodge was critical of these aspects of the Marrow Men's theology. He found fault in what he calls a "double reference" in the Marrow doctrine of the atonement. Some of the language used in the Fisher's book can only be called misleading at best and simply in error at worst. Here I'm thinking of a phrase used that "Christ has taken upon himself the sins of all men". As a Calvinist, I do not believe that is true. While it is true that the atonement was of infinite value and sufficient to atone for all the sins of all humanity, it is also true, as the Westminster Confessions teaches that "Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only" (WCF 3.6).

Hodge was also critical of some of the terminology used. Although accepting that Thomas Boston and the other leading Marrow Men stayed within the bounds of Reformed orthodoxy, Hodge was also clear that some of the Marrow language was not helpful or felicitous.

He wrote: "All their forms of expression were confused and their laborious distinctions utterly profitless. What is the significancy of making a special head of that 'giving love' which makes an actual grant of salvation upon conditions known to be absolutely impossible, and which makes no provision for its application, and which never intended the salvation of its objects?"

Quite.

He continues: "What real idea is signalized by the verbal distinction between the bona fide offer of the gospel to all, and the "Deed of Gift" of Christ upon which it is said to rest? What is the virtue of a 'Deed of Gift or Grant' which actually conveys nothing, and which was eternally intended to convey nothing?"

Indeed, we cannot disagree with Hodge here, nor when he maintains that God's "giving love" is "that highest and most wonderful form of love which 'spared not his own Son' [Romans 8:32] and not merely a kind of general benevolence towards the whole of humanity, even those destined not to be saved.

Hodge calls consistent Calvinists to reject any kind of double reference in the atonement, a general atonement for all on condition of faith, and a particular atonement for the elect. He recommends rejecting such "novelties" including these elements of the Marrow language.

The Free Offer of the Gospel

The final question then is what is the correct approach in Reformed theology, to warrant the full and free offer of the the gospel to all sinners? If it does not proceed from Amyralianism's hypothetical universalism nor from Marrow theology's universal deed of gift and grant of Christ to all?

The answer is that the free offer depends not on a universal atonement in one sense or the other, but on the sufficiency of the atonement, on the suitability of the atonement perfectly adapted for all sinners, on God's command and invitation expressed in the gospel offer, and in the promise made to all hearers of the gospel that if they believe in Jesus Christ they will be saved. To this we can safely add the comfort and encouragement that it is God's revealed will that he does not delight in the death of sinners, but rather desires that they would turn to him and live.

None of these require us to abandon or blur the teaching that on the cross Christ died to save his people from their sins and thereby save the world and that in doing so he fully achieved his intended aims, as John 3:17 plainly states: "For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but in order that the world might be saved through him" (ESV). 

  

Why I am Not a Molinist (Part 2)

We explained what Molinism means in Part 1 of this article and listed a number of objections to this theological model and view of divine sovereignty and human free will. In this post, we will explore nine objections raised to Molinism in more detail. 

The points made are not much more than brief summaries. For much greater detail on many of these points, the reader is invited to delve into a vast literature on the subject. Perhaps the single best place to start, would be either to read the relevant sections of Francis Turretin's Institutes of Elenctic Theology, particularly Topic 4 (The Knowledge of God), Questions 9-11. For a moden discussion, Paul Helm's book The Providence of God is a good read. 

The weight of these objections constitute the reasons why I am not a Molinist.

Objection 1: Molinism Denies God's Absolute Sovereignty and His Exhaustive and Unconditional Decree

Fundamentally, Molinism denies that God has an exhaustive and unconditional divine decree. According to Molinism, there are a multitude of possible worlds which are not feasible for God to create. He is only able to actualize worlds which are in line with the contents of middle knowledge. Suppose God knows that there are no circumstances that he could bring about in which person A will freely choose to do act B at time C. God is therefore constrained. There is no way for the God of Molinism to ordain that A will do B at time C according to Molinism.

This is in sharp contrast, it seems to me, with the God revealed in Scripture, who can do anything he desires and no one can stop him. This would include ordaining that A does B at C. The only restrictions on what God can ordain in Calvinism are things which are logically impossible (such as making a four-sided triangle) or things which are inconsistent with God's own being and character (God cannot turn the Trinity into a Quadrinity or will himself out of existence).

The following verses are deeply problematic for a Molinist understanding of providence, since they seem to admit of no restrictions on God's absolute sovereignty, whereas Molinism is built around a very significant delimiting factor in what middle knowledge makes feasible .[1]

'But our God is in the heavens. He does whatever he pleases.' (Psalm 115:3)

'Whatever Yahweh pleased, that he has done, in heaven and in earth, in the seas and in all deeps.' (Psalm 135:6)

'But he stands alone, and who can oppose him? What his soul desires, even that he does.' (Job 23:13)

'I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be restrained.' (Job 42:2) 

'All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing; and he does according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and no one can stop his hand, or ask him, “What are you doing?”' (Daniel 4:35)

'Yahweh has made everything for its own end—yes, even the wicked for the day of evil.' (Proverbs 16:4) 

'A man’s heart plans his course, but Yahweh directs his steps.' (Proverbs 16:9) 

'The king’s heart is in Yahweh’s hand like the watercourses. He turns it wherever he desires.' (Proverbs 21:1)

'Remember the former things of old; for I am God, and there is no other. I am God, and there is none like me. I declare the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things that are not yet done.
I say: My counsel will stand, and I will do all that I please.' (Isaiah 46:9-10)

'In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will.' (Ephesians 1:11, ESV) 

'For of him and through him and to him are all things. To him be the glory for ever! Amen.' (Romans 11:36)

The fundamental objection to Molinism is that the God it presents and how his providence works does not reflect the power and glory of the God of the Bible. 

Objection 2: Molinism Teaches a Type of Creaturely Independence and Contradicts Divine Aseity

Molinism teaches a form of Creaturely Independence which contradicts Divine Aseity. God's aseity is self-existence and total independence from the creation. The eternal God is dependent on no one for anything. However, in Molinism, God's choices are restricted by the content of middle knowledge, which delimits the feasible worlds that God could create.

As we will see, it is incoherent at best where the content of middle knowledge comes from. To argue that it restricts what God can do, and that God is somehow beholden to the choices of human beings contradicts this attribute of God. 

Objection 3: Molinism Requires Libertarian Free Will, Despite Lack of Biblical Evidence

Molinism relies on libertarian free will. Indeed, Molinism was created by Molina in an attempt to show that God's sovereignty could be harmonised with libertarian free will. Yet the Bible teaches that even human free choices are under the control of God's sovereign choice. Some of the verses we have already quoted clearly teach that human choices are under God's control.

An excellent article called 'Eleven (11) Reasons to Reject Libertarian Free Will' by John Hendryx explains the many problems with libertarian free will from a Christian point of view.

Libertarian Free Will is simply the view that when a person chooses to do something, at that moment, he could have chosen to do otherwise and that there is nothing determining the choice, not the circumstances, nor our desires, nor even our own affections. 

The problem with building a theological system around libertarian free will is that it is a philosophical concept and not one derived from Scripture. Rather the Scriptures presuppose that though we are free to make choices, such choices are not outside the scope of God's sovereignty. 

Objection 4: Molinism Teaches a Kind of Semi-Pelagianism 

Molinism smuggles in a kind of semi-Pelagian anthropolgy whereby sinners are able to do good, including saving good, in response to God's grace merely if put in the right set of circumstances, without the internal changes that Scripture describes, wrought in the sinner by the Holy Spirit. 

As human beings are dead in sin prior and unable to do good, prior to be regenerated by the Holy Spirit, it would not matter what circumstances a person was placed in, they would still not have faith in Christ. The key action, the monergistic work of the Holy Spirit in imparting spiritual life to a sinner, is not something Molinism would typically accept. 

Objection 5: Molinism Undermines Divine Simplicity and Immutability 

Molinism undermines divine simplicity and immutability. It makes God's knowledge partly dependent on his creation and makes his decree reactive to imagined human choices, rather than eternal and simple acts of the divine will. 

Objection 6: Molinism Weakens God's Providence and Efficacious Grace 

Molinism weakens God's providence and efficacious grace. God is restricted and can only select from feasible worlds one which matches his desires as closely as possible rather than the biblical view that God's sovereign decree reflects God's own desires perfectly and the world perfectly matches God's desires and wishes.

Objection 7: Molinism Teaches a Type of Conditional Election which is Impersonal 

Election in Molinism can only be a kind of conditional election, in that God chooses those he knows will believe when put in certain circumstances. This is not the unconditional election taught in the Scriptures.

Molinism usually teaches that God choose to actualise the world in which the maximum number of people are saved, but that there were feasible worlds in which any other people would be saved, though no feasible worlds in which everyone is saved. Thus, person A's election in the real world does not rest on God's sovereign choice primarily, but on the fact that A was part of the maximum number of saved people in this world. On the other hand person B, might have been saved in another world, but he is lost in the real world merely because the world in which he would have been saved did not deliver as many saved people overall. This seems ridiculous compared with the Calvinist view that in the real world God saved everyone for whom he has saving love and desires to actually save.

Objection 8: Molinism Rests on the Concept of Middle Knowledge Not Found in Scripture 

Molinism rests on the concept of middle knowledge, which is not found in the Scriptures. It is merely a clever philosophical speculation. Calvinism does a better job of reconciling divine sovereignty, which is absolute, and human free will and responsibility, which is derived from God's decree and is compatible with God's determining all things.

The supposed evidence for middle knowledge usually cited by Molinists is scant at best and can clearly be explained as part of God's natural knowledge of possibilities. In fact there are only two passages cited, which indicates the weakness of the scriptural data in favour of Molinism.

Matthew 11:23 - "You, Capernaum, who are exalted to heaven, you will go down to Hades. For if the mighty works had been done in Sodom which were done in you, it would have remained until today."

For one thing, the Molinist view requires Jesus' words here to be taken hyperliterally and not regard them as rabbinical hyperbole, which is a more natural reading of the text and a vivid way of saying that the people of Capernaum are morally no better (or even worse) than the people of Sodom. Secondly, even if the words are to be taken literally, this does not prove middle knowledge as understood in Molinism. It merely proves that God has knowledge of couterfactual possiblities, which Calvinsm does not deny via God's natural knowledge.

The second passage is 1 Samuel 23:11-13, in which David asks God two questions about what would happen if he remained in the town of Keilah. God asks if Saul will come there and God answers yes. David then asks if the men of Keilah will give him up to Saul if he stays there and God again answers yes. David then leaves Keilah. Again, this proves God has knowledge of counterfactuals (what if questions) but in no way does this prove Molinist middle knowledge. God would know all possibilities and counterfactuals from his natural knowledge and even in his free knowledge insofar as God would have decreed that David would ask these questions and receive truthful answers from God himself. 

To have only two passages that even hint at middle knowledge is not enough in my view to built such a weighty doctrinal scheme upon, especially when the passages are easily and fully explained without invoking the Molinist concept. 

Objection 9: Molinism is Unable to Present an Adequate Explanation for Why God Has Supposed Middle Knowledge (The Grounding Objection) or Where Middle Knowledge Comes From

The grounding objection has never been satisfactorily answered by Molinism. The grounding objection states that the central claim of Molinism is either completely incoherent or impossible. There is nothing in Molinism that explains (or grounds) why God possesses such knowledge of what people would freely choose to do in any circumstance in which they were placed.

In Calvinism, by contrast. God foreknows what a person will choose because God has ordained it.

For God to know what a person will freely choose in the libertarian sense of free will is both inexplicable and incoherent.

To give an example. Imagine a scientist builds a simple robotic car and places it in a complex maze. He says that the robot is not controlled by him in any way. It makes it's own decisions. At any junction in the maze, the car decides for itself whether to turn left or right or head straight on. If that it true, would we not conclude that it would be impossible for the scientist to know the precise route the robot car would take through the maze? Now suppose the scientist claimed that the robot car was free to make any choice, but he was able to predict the car's path precisely—how it would first turn left, then go straight on, then right, left, etc. Would we not, with good reason, assess that in some way the scientist is controlling the car to know with certainty what it's choices will be at each junction?

Likewise, in Molinism for God to know with certainty what all free choices will be is either an impossibility or there is signiciantly more control being exercised than the Molinist will allow. 

Interestingly, the open theist takes the first option and says such foreknowledge of free choices is impossible; the Calvinist takes the second option and says that free choices are compatible with God's overall control of events via the divine decree.

Closely linked to this, Molinists cannot explain where middle knowledge comes from as it comes from creatures with free will before God has decreed to create such creatures. Middle knowledge comes across as a series of brute facts about the universe with no explanation of why such facts or truths exist as they do not come from God's will, not from the creatures.

To conclude, we have to agree with Turretin's assessment of Molinism, back in the 17th century: "The fiction of middle knowledge (scientiae mediae) devised to maintain the idol of free will cannot be approved. It destroys the independence of God’s knowledge, subjects it to the creature, and makes it dependent upon the free determination of man.” (Institutes IV.10.6)

Notes

[1]  Unless otherwise stated, quotations are from the World English Bible, in the public domain.

Why I am Not a Molinist (Part 1)

As a Calvinist, there have been times when I have been attracted to Molinism and sought to explore this alternative model of divine providence. For those who do not know, Molinism is named after a Spanish Jesuit theologian, Luis de Molina, who was a counter-Reformer. His view is sometimes thought of as being somewhere between Calvinism and Arminianism.

Molinism teaches that God sovereignly controls everything that comes to pass (seemingly agreeing with Calvinism), but also holding that human beings have libertarian free will (seemingly agreeing with Arminianism). How can both ideas be reconciled? Molina accomplishes this by positing that God possesses scientia media or middle knowledge and that God is able to utilise this type of divine foreknowledge to have divine providential control over human free will choices (free in the libertarian sense). 

It works like this (according to Molinism).

God has three logical "moments" of divine foreknowledge. 

First, God has what is called natural knowledge. Natural knowledge is God's knowledge, in himself, of himself, and all logical possibilities that God could bring about. Natural knowledge contains everything that could happen.

Third, God has what is called free knowledge. Free knowledge is God's knowledge, after the divine decree of everything that will occur in the world God has decided to create. Free knowledge contains everything that will happen.  

Divine natural knowledge and free knowledge are accepted by all classical theists, including in Reformed theology and these are not controversial.

Molina's unique idea was to suggest that between the pre-decree natural knowledge and the post-decree free knowledge of God, there is something called middle knowledge, which is before the decree and prevolitional, i.e. not something that originates in God's will, but precedes it. Middle knowledge contains God knowledge of everything beings with libertarian free will would do in any possible circumstances. The best way to think of it is as a subset of God's natural knowledge of all possibilities. Middle knowledge are all the possibilities that could happen if human beings have libertarian free will. Middle knowledge is often summarised as containing everything that would happen.

Another way these three moments are sometimes described is that natural knowledge comprehends all possible worlds, middle knowledge (with libertarian free will granted) comprehends all feasible worlds, and free knowledge comprehends the one actual world God decided to create. 

This is a summary of what Molinism means. We will now outline the main reasons why Molinism is not a feasible view (pardon the pun) for the Bible-believing Christian in my view.

In summary, the problems with Molinism are the following:

1. Molinism denies God's absolute sovereignty and his exhaustive and unconditional decree.

2. Molinism teaches a form of creaturely independence which contradicts divine aseity.

3. Molinism requires libertarian free will, despite little biblical evidence for it. 

4. Molinism smuggles in a kind of semi-Pelagian anthropolgy whereby sinners are able to do good, including saving good, in response to God's grace merely if put in the right set of circumstances.

5. Molinism undermines divine simplicity and immutability. It makes God's knowledge partly dependent on his creation and makes his decree reactive rather than eternal and simple. 

6. Molinism weakens God's providence and efficacious grace.

7. Election in Molinism can only be a kind of conditional and impersonal election, in that God chooses those he knows will believe when put in certain circumstances. This is not the unconditional election of individuals whom God loves, as taught in the Scriptures.

8.   Molinism rests on the concept of middle knowledge, which is not found in the Scriptures.

9. Molinism is unable to present an adequate explanation for why God has supposed middle knowledge or where it comes from.

We will explore these nine objections to Molinism, from a Reformed theological viewpoint, further in Part 2.

Great Theologians 3: John Murray

John Murray (1898-1975)

John Murray was a Scottish-born Presbyterian theologian who spent most of his career at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. He was an ordained minister of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC).

Born in Sutherland in the far north of Scotland in 1898. Murray served in the Black Watch regiment during the First World War, losing an eye in the war. After the war, he became a theological student at the University of Glasgow and was a member of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland. He went to the USA to pursue further studies under J. Gresham Machen and Geerhardus Vos at Princeton Theological Seminary. In 1930, he broke with the Free Presbyterian Church and also moved with Machen from Princeton to the newly formed Westminster Theological Seminary, where he lectured in systematic theology for many years. He was also a trustee of the Banner of Truth Trust.

Murray never wrote his own systematic theology. His many essays and papers are published in four volumes of Collected Writings. His other major work was an excellent commentary on Romans in the New International Commentary series. He also wrote some popular-level works, including Redemption Accomplished and Applied which was the first book of Murray's that I read.

In my view, Murray's importance as a Reformed theologian lies not so much in the volume of writings he produced, but in some of the shorter works and essays he wrote. His short work The Covenant of Grace for example represents an important and novel approach to this key Reformed doctrine. The report he co-authored with Ned Stonehouse on The Free Offer of the Gospel is another short, but important and influential work.

After retiring from Westminster in 1966, Murray returned to Scotland to help look after his elderly sisters who still lived in Ross-shire. He joined the Free Church of Scotland and got married at the age of 69 in 1967 and had two children. Murray died on 8th May 1975 at the age of 76 and is buried in the Free Church Cemetery at Creich in the Scottish Highlands.

Great Theologians 2: W. G. T. Shedd

W. G. T. Shedd (1820-1894)

 

William Greenhough Thayer Shedd was a 19th century American Presbyterian theologian. Originally from Acton, Massachusetts, Shedd taught for most of his career at the Union Theological Seminary in New York.

His work reveals a sharp mind familiar with a wind range of academic disciplines, though his theology was staunchly Reformed and evangelical. 

He was an orthodox voice who argued for the doctrine of eternal punishment in his work The Doctrine of Endless Punishment (1885) and who argued against proposed revisions to the Westminster Confession of Faith to soften its Calvinist and predestinarian teachings, in Calvinism: Pure and Mixed (1893).

Shedd's magnum opus is his brilliant work of systematic theology, Dogmatic Theology (1888), which was originally published in three volumes.

I first came across Shedd's systematic theology in the early 1990s in the University Library and found explanations of a number of doctrines both clear and convincing. I was later able to find an original set  in a second hand bookshop. A modern reprinting is now available, edited by Alan Gomes and published by Prebyterian and Reformed Books, and I recommend it highly.

His work comes from a similar place on the theological spectrum from the Hodges at Princeton, but Shedd does not follow Hodge in all matters and I think is sometimes a clearer writer, though Charles Hodge often goes into a fuller range of subjects and in greater detail than Shedd. More on Hodge later in this series most probably.

Any work you find by Shedd, whether his books of sermons, his commentary on Romans, or his theological works is well worth reading if you come across it. His writings on everlasting punishment in hell remain some of the key texts in the debate, whether the relevant chapter in Dogmatic Theology or his earlier work on the same subject.